A measured look at presidential authority in Venezuela maritime strikes

The recent U.S. strikes on maritime targets tied to narco-trafficking in Venezuelan waters have sparked national conversation, but the security stakes reach far beyond a single news cycle.

Narcoterrorism networks operating in the Caribbean and South America have destabilized the region and harmed American communities, leading every president since Ronald Reagan to rely on statutory and Article II authorities to disrupt their pipelines. Understanding these legal and historical foundations clarifies how presidential administrations of both parties have approached the fight against narco-trafficking.

Decades of U.S. counternarcotics policy reflect a difficult truth: The Western Hemisphere remains the primary source of illicit drugs flowing into the United States. From 2010 to 2015 alone, federal agencies spent nearly $39 billion on efforts to disrupt these networks, emphasizing the need to intercept drugs before they reach American communities.

This long record helps explain why Republican and Democratic administrations have relied on maritime interdiction and, at times, use-of-force authorities as part of a broader strategy to disrupt trafficking routes.

These operations rest on well-established constitutional and statutory authorities. Under Article II of the Constitution, presidents may direct limited military or law enforcement actions to defend U.S. security interests, particularly when threats are urgent or cross borders. Congress has also granted explicit counternarcotics tools under Title 10, including sections 124 and 284, which authorize the Defense Department to detect, monitor and interdict trafficking in international waters.

These authorities allow U.S. forces to target the networks that move narcotics, weapons and illicit financing throughout the hemisphere and long predate the current operations near Venezuela.

The actions we see taking place in Venezuela aren’t without precedent. Successive presidents have used these powers in similar ways. Reagan launched maritime interdictions in the Caribbean; President Clinton expanded aerial and maritime tracking; and Presidents George W. Bush and Obama deepened cooperation with regional partners to disrupt trafficking networks. Across administrations, narco-terrorists have been treated as cross-border destabilizing actors, which is why U.S. commanders in chief exercise these authorities.

Our national defenses view counternarcotics enforcement as a core national security mission. They serve as the federal government’s lead agency for detecting and monitoring airborne and maritime drug movements, working with domestic and international partners to interdict narcotics before they reach U.S. shores. As Pentagon officials have emphasized, these operations are carefully reviewed and conducted in accordance with U.S. and international law.

Venezuela presents one of the most complex environments for these missions. Years of political and economic collapse under the Maduro regime have opened the door to criminal organizations, and the country’s extensive coastline and access to the Caribbean and South Atlantic make it a prime transit hub for maritime drug trafficking.

These conditions have forced the United States and neighboring countries to confront increasingly entrenched networks that exploit Venezuelan territory with little internal resistance.

Though recent operations near Venezuela fit into a long-standing pattern of U.S. counternarcotics activity grounded in presidential authority and congressional statute, they still demand careful coordination between U.S. forces and regional partners. To meet an evolving transnational threat, the United States must maintain clear legal frameworks, robust oversight and the operational tools necessary to shield our communities from the violence, corruption and addiction wrought by narcotics trafficking.